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Abstract— With the quickened phenomenal expansion of data, storing massive data has become important and increasingly growing 
day by day. Thus, big data came to express this large data and handling it properly under three important characteristics such as 
volume, veracity, and Variety. One practical of big data problems is user and services authentication. Kerberos v5 protocol provided 
a new solution to such this problem in the Hadoop-distributed platform (HDP). In this paper, we suggest a credible scheme by adding 
one more level of protection and authentication security to the Kerberos v5 protocol by using a static knowledge-based authentication 
(SKBA). Where in the login and verification phase by using Kerberos protocol, the KDC will replay with a question to the user-side to 
check the actual presence of user which the user already answered this question in his registration phase. Our credible scheme is 
useful in case of capturing messages that enable an eavesdropper to get the ticket that allows getting access to the HDFS as well as to 
avoid the common attacks with less computation, communication and storage cost. The proposed scheme works seriously and strictly 
to ensure the registration by delivery of user information over an insecure network in a safe manner and store this information in the 
KDC-database to be used later for getting access with HDFS. 
 




Big data is a utilized term to express data of enormous 
volume and complexity [1]; these data grow very fast thus 
difficult to be efficiently processed [2]. Modern software is 
needed such Apache Hadoop which uses map reduce for 
handling such massive data volume and make it able to be 
processed and analyzed by parallelizing the processing and 
using distributed hardware [3], which considered as a big-
data processing framework of open source software used by 
several of massive online media such as Yahoo, Facebook, 
and Twitter. Because of the insensitive data used previously, 
Hadoop was not had that much of importance [4]–[6]. What 
makes it imperfect, limited access solution to the cluster 
cloud and other systems with traditional methods, which 
designed to process structured data such as data warehouse 
and management systems of a relational database are unable 
to handle large-scale data of unstructured type using an 
effective way [7]. Thus, HDFS is used to deal with such data 
type of sensitive and personal information, but its problems 
still existed until that time, especially in its authentication 
where it is possible for any user to penetrate and spy another 
user or cluster services [8]. 
Moreover, the security of Big Data is an important issue 
[9, 10], which must focus on precisely to avoid its caused 
problems which may result by the access of unauthorized 
part, such illegal-modification, impersonated-publication and 
impersonated-retrieval [11]. To inhibit these, then proceed to 
build and design an adaptable authentication scheme has 
become indispensable, which enable to verify users and 
prevent impersonation as long as such other threaten security 
attacks. 
In the field of authentication of big data, many proposals 
have been formulated and which in turn led to results that 
may be somewhat satisfactory. Ruidongli at al [12]declared 
some requirements that have to be met where integrity for 
big data, secure registration, secure data retrieval, efficient 
and flexible authorization, and distributed design are some. 
For that, they proposed DAAS (Distributed Authentication 
and Authorization Scheme) to achieve the above 
requirements and in its turn solve problems of AAA and CP-
ABE based scheme systems. Their proposed scheme has 
some additional properties, thus met the proposed 
requirement such as integrity for big data, trustworthy 
registration for entities, publisher, user identity verification, 
security key establishment, flexible authorization, and 
automatic attribute updates, what make it as secure as IBS 
and CCP-ABE. Wang et al. [13] proposed a scheme, where 
the cloud center user gets access to decide who to share with 
the data. They consider starting to share data only with a 
receiver who have certain attributes, in this case, providers 
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of data along with the receivers have to verify the 
authenticity of each other to be sure that data and the identity 
will not be leaked out.  
Moreover, they proposed a verification mechanism to 
verify the authenticity of users' attributes. This total system 
called pre-authentication approach to proxy re-encryption 
where providers can verify the receivers' authenticity where 
the security under several attacks are ensured such as 
selective condition CCA, selective identity CCA and 
collusion attack, and make sure that the re-encryption keys, 
cipher text, and the attributes of users are anonymous. Shen 
et al. [14] proposed a protocol, which resorts to the tree-
based signature to significantly improve the security of 
attribute authorization. And they extend the proposed 
authentication protocol to support multiple levels in the 
hierarchical attribute authorization structure to satisfy the big 
data requirements, where they show that their protocol can 
resist the forger attack and replay attack. In the framework 
of other, Ouda [2] investigates the development of a new 
authentication system that related to 'something you do' to 
find out unique patterns of the users' dynamic behaviors their 
new framework is for user authentication that leverages big 
data analytics.  
Whereas organizations can collect identifiable 
information, Ibrahim and Ouda [15] presented an 
investigated for the implementation option for the new 
authentication approach [2]. IDA is an implementation of the 
second component of the big data-based user authentication 
framework. IDA investigation development stands on two 
main activities, first to create a user profile to study human 
dynamics and behavior, then analyze the practices and 
actions of the user and then classify user behavior 
accordingly. Second is to generate a questionnaire to 
authenticate users. Such that the real-time analysis of user's 
profiles helps generate a random set of challenging questions 
what made the authentication on demand feature is obtained.  
Thus, their investigation approaches helped create a 
highly distributed authentication model, minimizing the 
storage of secrets, and lesser secret management overhead. 
By talking about the environment distributed, Abdullah et al. 
[16] published a proposal, where they presented the 
drawbacks of the normal Kerberos with identifying most of 
the authentication requirements that can enhance the big data 
security. Then introduced their improved proposal which 
based on the rising technology of block chain as a suggestion 
of utilizing the advantages of block chain technology could 
be leveraged to harden security systems, including 
authentication and authorization of big data.  
Moreover, Hadoop has used the delegation tokens [8] by 
proposing a scheme that allows the clients of HDFS to 
authenticate through the block-access-token (BAT). This 
authentication token provided by data-node, where it used to 
protect sensitive data in HDFS to contra some of the attacks 
such replay attacks as well as impersonation attacks, the 
proposed HDFS authentication scheme hire elliptic-curve-
cryptography (ECC) to create delegation tokens which are 
destined to works on master-slave architecture. Which work 
with smaller key size, reducing storage and transmission 
requirements [16] it supported the protection of the 
exchanged information between name-node and data-node in 
term of authentication. This scheme protects sensitive data 
stored in HDFS. However, have a weakness observed when 
users share public and private keys in both TLS and SSH 
implementation within a cloud environment [17].  
Moreover, Rahul and GireeshKumar [18] proposed a new 
authentication framework for clients, by using cryptographic 
functions such as public key cryptography, private key 
cryptography, hashing functions, and random number 
generator, which helped to enhanced Hadoop security by 
adding a unique key to be used along with all clients. It is a 
secure protocol despite its drawback of the type of 
communication that all go through the layer by using the 
encrypted symmetric key. Hadoop used symmetric essential 
operation of Kerberos [19] too as an authentication solution 
to both users and services in the Hadoop-distributed platform 
(HDP), by using automatic fashion of implementation to 
MIT Kerberos for authentication that creates users and gives 
them to Ambari with admin privileges where Ambari hold 
all the services, clients and Keytabs.  
In this paper, in the proposed work, a new proposal has 
been devised using the Kerberos v5 protocol with one more 
level of protection. It uses static knowledge-based 
authentication (SKBA) by a trusted phase for registration, 
login, and verification. It is intended to create a compelling 
and strict method allows users to access the HDFS server in 
a secure and protected manner in a perfect way which it will 
avoid famous common threats on the communication 
channel. The proposed tightly controlled schemes are for 
recording users and their required data in a safe way to later 
use in the login and verification process as an additional 
level that supports Kerberos in the failure case as well as to 
avoid most of the common attacks with less computation, 
communication and storage cost. 
For more clarity, the proposed scheme strengthens the 
protection of authentication information exchanged between 
users and HDFS. The proposed design uses communication 
on a Kerberos v5 protocol using static knowledge-based 
authentication (SKBA) as an additional level. This is after 
the user registered his required information in the KDC 
database. Means it consist of two main phases first is for 
user registration where it will be done between users and 
KDC of their realm. Which allow users to be registered by a 
strong authentication way providing resistance to attacks of 
both passive and active. This phase ensures users to deliver 
the requested data such a password and the answer to the 
question that the server is putting in a safe manner on a 
confidential database in the KDC server side. Second is the 
login and verification phases, which are proceed by 
Kerberos v5 where the KDC will ask the user who wants 
access to answer his secret question that he already answered 
during his registration phase, to verify his identity in the 
event that someone could penetrate the protocol to 
impersonate his personality, since in this case will not be 
useful. As Even if the invader can get the ticket that enables 
him to access the HDFS server, will not be capable of 
replaying with the correct answer in the pre-limited time, so 
the HDFS server will reject him directly. Fig.1. illustrate the 
general structure of the adopted scenario, which consists of 
several points, shown as follows: 
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 Fig.1. The general structure of the proposed approach 
 
1- User request authentication to KDC 
2- TGT + Session Key 
3- Request ticket + Authenticator 
4- Ticket _ Session Key 
5- Retrieve Question and Answer as a static knowledge-
based authentication (SNBA) then send a question to 
the user and Answer to the server. 
6- Provide answer + Request serves + authenticator. 
7- Compare Answers if valid send server authentication 
to the user. 
Moreover, some principals related to the current study are 
provided as follow: 
A. Kerberos v5: 
Kerberos is an ideal protocol of authentication for trusted 
hosts on untrusted channel [20]. It uses to ensure secure 
communication by verifying users identities on an 
unprotected network to ensure the privacy of data by 
allowing the authentication between users and services. 
Meaning, each of users and services managed to identify 
each other [21], which is summarized as not requiring from 
the user to be registered in each server, and user's username 
and password do not need to be known in their storage. 
Users can enter to the server through two-step login; first, 
they get authentication at authentication-server (AS), and 
second, gets a real ticket for a specific server [22]. The client 
uses this ticket to log onto an application server. As shown 
in the above fig.2. 
B. Knowledge-Based Authentication [23]: 
It is one of the commonly used methods of user 
authentication, where the user asked to answer at least one 
'secret' question. It used to use in multifactor authentication 
(MFA) as well as self-service password retrieval. The 
question should be appropriate for a large segment of 
inhabitancy similarly in case of the answer which it has to be 
an only one correct answer for each question and difficult to 
guess or discovered. There are two cases of the question 
posed, where it can be static or dynamic, wherein in the 
static scheme case, the user is the one who will choose 
questions that he wants to answer from the list of the 
predetermined list stored by the host and then will provide 
his correct answer. Questions should be realistic, clear and 
easy to save for the user such as "when did you complete 
your master degree?", "what is your favorite food?" 
 
 
Fig.2.Kerberos key distributed center and its component 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD  
The proposed scheme is shown in this part, which mimics 
the authentication between the user and the server in the 
environment of the Hadoop-distributed platform. Kerberos 
protocol used to define the rules of users, servers, and 
applications on communication to guard Hadoop distributed 
platform against any possible failure in term of user 
authentication before accessing HDFS. Kerberos v5 with 
using a static knowledge-based authentication (SKBA) had 
recycled as provided an additional level to protect the user 
from impersonation attack or any real impersonate to the 
user's personality by checking the presence of the true user. 
where the KDC will replay with question that  related to the 
user in the database and he already answered due to its 
registration phase, this phase are built in a serious and strict 
way to ensure the registration and delivery of user 
information over an insecure network in a safe manner, and 
store it in the KDC database.  
The proposed scheme of conception consists of three 
entities: 1] HDFS client that belongs to the realm of the 
KDC: the person, or entity who want to get ability to access 
to HDFS, 2] KDC, the key distribution center, it is the third 
party contains the database in which user information will be 
stored. 3] HDFS server, the place the user aims to access, it 
known as the Hadoop distributed file system. There are a 
basic four storing identification parameters assigned to each 
user identified by ID in their registration phase, this 
parameter utilized to authenticate users through their login 
and verification phase, where they are as the user 
identification, user's password, question and user's answer, 
respectively. The password-footprint along with a random 
salt in the proposed scheme will be applied to generate keys 
encryption/decryption to ensure the user identification and 
messages confidentiality exchanged during communication. 
A. Terms and Definitions 
• g: a primitive root modulo P (often called a 
generator). 
• B: a random private key. 
• S: salt 
• ID: user identity. 
• Pw: the user's password 
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• Q: question 
• ANS: answer to the question 
• A, B: corresponding public keys. 
• H( ): one-way hash function. 
• K: session key. 
• T1: the current time of the input device when writing 
the answer 
• T2: a time when the server receives the answer. 
• T3: the difference between T1 and T2 and it have 
been within a predefined threshold 
Notes: 
• The values P, g are well-known values agreed to 
beforehand. 
• b is a random private key on the KDC-side. 
B. The conception of the Proposed Approach  
1) Registration phase: In this phase, the user will be 
capable of generating an individual username and password, 
which will also enable him to answer one of the secret 
questions that he will choose and then submit this 
information and store it safely in the KDC database. Thus, 
four authentication parameters will be generated based on 
mathematical operations formulated for authentication. Each 
user must have a valid password, and unique-ID, then, he 
must choose an appropriate question, as well as provided his 




Step1: user side - Enter user-ID and pw.  
Step2: Send user ID to KDC-side. 
Step3: KDC side - Generate b as a random private key, 
and calculate AA=h(ID||b).  
Step4: send AA to user-side. 
Step5: user side - Calculate , 
Calculate , and 
calculate . 
Step6: send A to KDC-side. 
Step7: KDC side - calculate , Get   , 
calculate , Get K=H(S),   and select 
T1 
Step8: send B,  to user-side. 
Step9: user side - Calculate , Get K=H(S), 
, ,  and  
Step10: Send PSS, ANS, T2 to KDC-side 
Step11: KDC side - Check T3 is a valid time where T3= 
T2-T1,  and . 





























Fig.3. Registration phase of the proposed approach 
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2) Login and verification phase: In this phase, users 
must prove their self by user-ID to the KDC server, as the 
KDC based on a trusted third party [24]. For this reason, the 
user-side sends user-ID to the KDC server without sending 
the password, KDC server must checks this user-ID in its 
database if it exists it will start with its normal steps. For 
more secure authentication of KDC, it will retrieve the user's 
question from the database and submit it to that used to 
verify his or her credibility if he who asking the access or 
another person impersonates him. While the user has sent the 
correct answer after he showed his ticket, he will be capable 
of accessing, unless the access will be rejected directly from 
the HDFS server itself. The following fig.4. Shows the 




































Fig.4. Login and verification phase of the proposed approach 
 
Algorithm: 
Step1: user side - Inter ID and password (pw). 
Step2:  Send ID to KDC. 
Step3: KDC side - Check if ID exists, Generate salt, and 
get . 
Step4:  To user. 
Step5: user side - Get , 
= , and Generate  
Step6: Send  to KDC. 
Step7: KDC side - Verifies the user identity and the 
validity of the ticket then get Qs=S Q and 
 related to the user ID. 
Step8: Send  from KDC-
side to the user-side. 
Step9: Send  from 
KDC-side to the server 
Step10: server-side – get   
Step11: user side – = 
 ,   , Q= S , ANS= 
Answer of Q, and get  
step12:  from User-
side to the server. 
Fig.4. Login and verification phase of the proposed approach 
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Step13: in Server side - Verifies the user identity and the 
valid of the ticket, then get , 
get  then compare f(ANS) 
with that one which got it from KDC in step10. 
Step14: if the comparison is valid, send  
from server-side to the user side. 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A. Security Analyses 
In this section, we will present the security analysis of the 
proposed approach by discussing some of the common 
attacks we have addressed through a powerful and strict way 
to enable users access to HDFS in a more robust secure 
manner over the untrusted channel. And explain the 
explanation of how to avoid them, these attacks mentioned 
and described below. 
1) Guessing attack: The proposed registration phase 
provide zero-knowledge security by using the unify key 
K=H(S), which is the hash result calculated in both side 
based on some other mathematical formulae as we see in eq1 
in the user-side and eq2 in the KDC-side 
 
  (1) 
 
  (2) 
 
Moreover, the password never be shared during the 
transmission, it is a cryptographic function "pss" of 'PWW' 
that we got it by the predefined g power the virtualization 
function of the original password f(pw) as shown in eq3 and 
eq4. Finally, the result will be sent  
 
  (3) 
 
  (4) 
 
Moreover, the scheme will help to avoid the attacks of 
password guessing even after the key detected because the 
password will be in formulae of eq3, and only the KDC 
server can solve this formula to know the value of "g" which 
never sent through the channel. The same with the proposed 
login and verification proposed phase where the password 
never needs to share over the network, where we used salt to 
get the first key to reciprocation between the user and 
HDFC server as shown in eq5. 
 
  (5) 
 
Where the password already exists in both side what 
makes guess the original password is almost impossible. The 
same happens with an answer too during translation, where 
first the virtualization function will be calculated then 
encrypt them and send in the form of eq6. 
 
  (6) 
 
2) Replay attack: A replay attack occurs when a third 
party captures a command in transmission and replays it at a 
later time. In the proposed registration phase, finding 
discrete logarithmic is a complicated problem where even in 
case the eavesdropper obtains the inverse logarithm of such 
a high exponential number to get 'a,' especially when the 
value g is a predefined value in both side, eq7, and eq9 show 
that. 
 
  (7) 
 
  (8) 
 
As well as, it is also required from the user-side to replay 
during a limited predefined time which makes T3 is valid to 
be able to continue, where T3 as in eq9. 
 
  (9) 
 
For the login and verification phase, we have used the 
advantages of Kerberos protocol to avoid this attack, adding 
another level of protection, which even if the intruder could 
get the ticket that enables him to access the HDFS server, he 
will be not able to provide the server by the correct answer, 
thus the server will reject him directly . 
3) Brute-force and dictionary attacks: the attacker tries 
to attain the password or any personal information, which 
may enable the intruder to get user's information on the 
channel to be stored in the database of KDC server. In the 
proposed registration phase, we send an exponential value 
over the channel to get the common key A and B, where 
they are shown as eq10, and eq11. 
 
  (10) 
 
  (11) 
 
Thus, brute-force and dictionary attacks will be avoided 
and will be very costly and time waster. The same in the 
proposed login and registration phase where the effect of salt 
in eq12 used to disrupt the password and help to create a 
most reliable login and verification phases, therefore, 
listening to requests pass between the user and the KDC or 
by brute force to guess the original password is almost 
impossible. 
 
  (12) 
 
Also, dictionary attacks will be avoided too. As the 
proposed phase used Kerberos, and it established to hidden 
password. Thus the proposed principal minimizes the 
probability of finding the password that caused by 
disturbance by adding dynamic salt per session and used of 
virtualization function, therefore even if capturing several 
messages by intruders; they will not have the opportunity to 
get the password. 
4)  Man in the middle:  In the man in the middle attack, 
an eavesdropper tries to impersonate either the client or 
server and thus change the message passed or attain valuable 
information. In the proposed registration phase, the 
eavesdropper in the KDC can intercept A and B only which 
shown in eq13 and eq14 as it sent over the channel. However, 
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these values are not enough yet to calculate the session key 
"S," which calculate it as eq15, and eq16. For the both side 
respectively, because the value of "a" on the user-side is not 
known and to get it we have to calculate mathematical 
formulae shown in eq17, that include "AA" which need the 
value "b" to be calculated as shown in eq18,  "b" generate 
randomly in the server-side. Moreover, "a, b" is set and well 
known to the user-side and server-side respectively and 
never shared through the channel. 
 
  (13) 
 
  (14) 
 
  (15) 
 
  (16) 
 
  (17) 
 
  (18) 
 
Moreover, Kerberos applied in login and verification 
phase use tickets that contain the authentication information 
of its holder and are encrypted using the key of the final 
recipient. Therefore, no one knows any knowledge about the 
ticket content nor modify it. 
5)  Insider attack: An insider attack is a malicious attack 
perpetrated on a network or computer system by a person 
with authorized system access [25]. Where in the proposed 
registration phase the value of "AA" is protected by secure 
one way hash function shown in eq18, and any modification 
to these value will be detected between the user and server, 
where it will result in a different value of the formula "S" in 
both side which Table 1 describes. Moreover, b is a random 
value in KDC-side. 
TABLE I 









For the proposed login and verification phase, the KDC 
will ask the user to answer his secret question that he already 
answered in the phase of registration to verify his identity if 
someone could penetrate the protocol to impersonate his 
personality. Since in this case, it will not be useful, because 
even if an intruder got the ticket that enables him to access 
the HDFS server, he would not be able to answer the 
question, so the HDFS server will reject him directly. Thus 
insider attack will be avoided. 
6) User anonymity: Suppose that the attacker has 
intercepted user-side authentication messages such as "AA, 
A." Thus, the adversary may try to retrieve any static 
parameter from these massages. However, "AA, A" all are 
not have the same value in each session, but their value will 
be vary depending on the random generator value given on 
the KDC-side "b," as shown in eq18, eq19, eq20. , the 
random "b" never share over the channel. Thus, the proposed 
scheme of the proposed registration phase can overcome the 
security flow of user anonymity breach. 
 
  (19) 
 
  (20) 
 
  (21) 
 
Moreover, the effect of salt used to disrupt the password 
helps to create a most reliable login, and verification phases 
provided resistance to the user anonymity attack. 
7) Impersonation attack: The proposed registration phase 
provide a secure and strong authentication protocol to supply 
resistances to attacks over a secure exchange on the channel 
it minimizes the guessing likelihood of parameters 
reciprocation between client and HDFS server. What makes 
the impersonation attack is a week to be active during its 
steps. 
For the login and registration phase, also resistance to 
such attack by using a most trust Kerberos protocol by 
adding an additional level, for the purpose of user protection 
against impersonation attack, or real impersonate to the 
user's personality, by check the presence of the real user, 
where the KDC will retrieve the user's question from the 
database. Then submit it to the user in the encrypted form of 
eq21 to verify his credibility. Whether he who asking the 
access or another person impersonate him and wait to correct 
user answer to submit it back in the encrypted form of eq22. 
After the HDFS server checks the answer to be valid, then 
allow him to access, unless it will be rejected directly from 
the HDFS server itself. 
 
  (22) 
 
  (23) 
 
Table.2 shows the security features of the proposed scheme. 
TABLE II 
SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON 
 
B. Performance Analysis 
In this section, we compare the performance and security 
features of the proposed schemes of registration and login 
and verification phases with that of related schemes, which 
applied in the area of security of big data in Hadoop 
distributed file system. To prove the efficiency of the 
proposed scheme, we discuss the performance analysis by 
computing the cost of computation, communication, and 
Security analysis Avoided 
Password guessing attack Yes 
Replay attack Yes 
Man in the middle attack Yes 
brute-force  Yes 
dictionary attacks Yes 
insider Yes 
impersonation Yes 
User  anonymity Yes 
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storage overhead. Comparisons with some related schemes 
are also provided in this section. The identity ID, Password 
pw, salt, secret one-way hash function, visualization function, 
ticket, answer all recommended to be 128-bit long, while the 
random number, question, and the encrypted session key all 
1024-bit long, other value as time stamp is of 32-bit long. 
The meaning of notations used in the comparison is given in 
table3. 
TABLE III 
THE NOTATION USED IN COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON 






Symmetric key encryption/decryption 
 
1) Computation cost: Table 4 shows the composition 
results of the computation cost of the proposed method over 
the compared methods for the registration phase, whereas 
table 5 show the result of the login and verification phase. 
TABLE IV 
 THE COMPUTATION COST OF THE REGISTRATION PHASE 







THE COMPUTATION COST OF LOGIN AND VERIFICATION PHASE 







During the registration phase, the total computation cost 
of the user and the server is  , which consider 
something less efficiency. Hence, the steps of the proposed 
scheme phase must be done accurately and with a 
complicated way to be something difficult to decipher or 
penetrate. It is sensitive data and the stage of communication 
will depend on it. Thus, it must be stored safely. 
Nevertheless, that will not affect the proposed work, because 
this phase will run only once for a single user only during his 
registration to the KDC server. In contrast, in the proposed 
login and verification phase, the total computation cost of 
the user and server is . Where the proposed scheme 
here is more efficient than Jeong and Kim [10] by the 
symbols used as well as efficient than Rahul and 
GireeshKumar [18] which need 21 crucial symmetric 
encryption. 
2) Communication cost: To compute the cost of 
communication we mainly focus on the efficiency of login 
and verification phases since these phases are the main body 
of an authentication scheme and are executed much more 
frequently than the other phases. In the proposed scheme the 
communication overhead includes the capacity of the 
transmitted message involved in the authentication process, 
which is 5216 = (160×7 + 1024 ×4) bit. It is considered the 
best compared to some previous works. Table6 shows the 
cost of communication for each of [10] and [18] calculated 
in the same way and assuming that the variables in each of 
them have the same value. 
TABLE VI 
COMMUNICATION COST OF LOGIN AND VERIFICATION PHASE 
Our method Jeong and Kim [10] 
Rahul and 
GireeshKumar [18] 
5216 9280 6912 
 
3) Storage overhead cost: In the proposed schemes, the 
parameters {ID, f(pw), Q, f(ANS)} are stored in the database 
of the KDC server. Thus the storage cost is 1504 = ( 3×160 
+ 1×1024)bit. Table7 provides the comparison results of the 
proposed method over the related scheme [10], [18]. It 
shows that the storage cost of the proposed method is the 
lowest and best. 
TABLE VII 
STORAGE COST OF LOGIN AND VERIFICATION PHASE 
Our method Jeong and Kim [10] 
Rahul and 
GireeshKumar [18] 
1504 6112 3392 
C. Representation of the Result 
Tables 6 and 7 above are graphically drawn in the Fig.5 
and Fig.6 sequentially to show the difference of values of 
each work clearly. 
 
Fig. 5 communication cost of login and verification phase 
 
Fig. 6 Storage cost of login and verification phase 
The results were gained based on the performance and 
security features analysis rule on the proposed schemes of 
registration and login and verification phases to get the 
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Computation cost, Communication cost and Storage cost by 
the same way used in Ding [26].   
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
We have suggested a new scheme using Kerberos with a 
static knowledge-based authentication to authenticate users 
in Hadoop distributed platform. It works in two phases, first 
a serious salt and strict way to ensure the registration phase, 
which allows the users to store their information by a robust 
authentication way providing resistance for many attacks. 
Second the login and verification phase that use registered 
users’ information to get access to HDFS server that strives 
to provide a stronger and complex access mechanism. 
 In this work, we have added a new protection level to 
leverage Kerberos, where made it more resistant to 
personality impersonation in case of capturing messages that 
allow an eavesdropper to get the ticket that will enable him 
accessing the HDFS server. We have shown that the scheme 
can handle password guessing, replay, brute force, dictionary, 
man-in-middle, user anonymity, and impersonation and 
insider attacks with less computation, communication, and 
storage cost. 
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